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Soviet current policies in the United Nations Organization and in relations with
the free world at large have their roots in the early days of the revolutionary regime,
when the October Revolution gave power to the Bolshevik Party. At that time
Russia, one of the great European powers, was on the brink of military disaster due
to her involvement in war and her alignment with the Entente in conflict with the
Central Powers. The defeat of the imperial army sowed the seeds of the revolution.
At the same time, the new regime was painfully aware that in order to survive and
to save the country from foreign conquest and political disintegration it must
drastically change the situation. It was imperative that Russia be extricated from the
war.
The idea of political and military disengagement was by no means the monopoly
of the Bolshevik Party. It had its partisans in the imperial government, in certain
political circles in Russia, and even among the members of the imperial family. The
strength of the Bolsheviks lay in the fact that only they had a political theory and
a philosophy of neutrality in that period of history and in that particular situation.
Lenin's views, formulated in his major work, State and Revolution, served to make
virtue of Russia's inability to fulfill the terms of the Alliance, and furnished a plan
for action. According to Lenin the war was an imperialist war, fought not for the
ideals of liberation, but for control of markets and world supply of raw materials.
The real aim of the warring parties was to increase their dominions by the enslave-
ment of the weaker nations. The decree on Peace, which was one of the first acts
of the new regime, declared that: "To continue this war for the sole purpose of
determining how to shape out control of the subjugated nations by the rich and
powerful countries was a major crime against humanity."'
In order to stop the war, the Bolshevik regime proposed an immediate conclusion
of peace, and sued for peace itself.
The decree repudiated the alliance with Western powers. In order to justify it,
the Bolsheviks published secret treaties and agreements between Russia and other
members of the Entente regarding post-war territorial settlements which indeed
anticipated vast acquisitions for Russia, France, and Britain. Furthermore, the new
8M.L.L. 1931, Dr. iur. 1932, University of Lwow, Poland; S.J.D. 1934, Harvard University. Lecturer
in International and Comparative Law, University of Lwow, 1936-39. Senior Research Associate, Rule
of Law Research Center, Duke University. Author, SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: DOCTRINES AND SOCIAL
FUNCTIONS (1962); Tsa SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS (x964).
'S.U. RSFSR (Soviet Laws), 1917-18, no. I.
SoviET BLOC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
r~gime looked with suspicion at various plans of the Western Powers to help Russia
in her war effort. According to Potemkin's History of Diplomacy, which was to
establish the official record of those times for the instruction of posterity, in the Fall
of 1917 Britain, the United States, and France had reached an agreement to cooperate
in "assistance" to Russia. The United States assumed responsibility for the re-
organization of Russian railways, and Britain, for the development and equipment of
the sea transport, while France undertook to give assistance to the army. However,
the terms of the agreement were changed in a manner which in Russian eyes was
proof of the far from friendly intentions of the Western Allies. Assistance to the
Murmansk railway was assigned to Britain, while Western and South Western rail-
ways were to come under the French control. The Russians feared that the new
agreement was not only a case of gross intervention in the internal affairs of Russia,
gut a first step towards her partition into foreign spheres of influence.2 Thus, as
the new masters saw it, Russia's war sacrifices earned her nothing but defeat and
humiliation, and held a prospect of enslavement at the hands of her imperialistic
friends. To serve the nation and the interests of humanity the Bolshevik regime
felt entitled to seek a separate peace with the Central Powers.
The decree on Peace, which declared void all secret treaties which were to benefit
Russian landowners and the capitalist class, the ruling class in the Empire; was
followed by another measure, this time aiming at the economic disengagement of
Russia. The decree of People's Commissars of January 28, 1918 annulled "finally
and without exception" all foreign loans to the previous regime as contrary to the
new political reality.'
Stated in those terms, the policy disengagement remained for a long time the
guiding line of Soviet foreign policy. Its main idea was that the Socialist state is,
by its very nature, free from those entanglements which result from the struggle
and ambitions of the imperialist powers: Soviet policy is such that it cannot be
affected by the conflicts and internal contradictions of the world economic and
political order.
The fullest expose of the position of the socialist Russia in world affairs was made
by the Russian delegation to the Genoa Conference (April-May i922), which sought
to re-establish the economic and political unity of Europe. One of the key problems
vis-ai-vis Russia was the reconstruction and revival of her industrial and economic
assets, to make her again a partner in foreign trade. This was impossible without
foreign capital, and the members of the Conference sought to convince the new
Russian regime that its repudiation of foreign loans and nationalization of foreign
enterprises were obstacles to effective economic cooperation. Before new capital
was made available, the Russian government had to mend its ways and make some
concession to foreign interests. However, this plea fell on deaf ears. The Russian
delegation refused to discuss the matter in terms of practical steps and came out
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with a broad statement. of principle, which justified its past policy, and asserted
that the Russian regime was entitled to discuss terms of economic cooperation on
the basis of new agreements and commitments. In its memorandum of May ii,
1922, the Russian delegation stated that:
S*. . revolutions, which are a violent rupture with the past, carry with them new
juridical relations in the foreign and domestic affairs of states, Governments and systems
that spring from the revolution are not bound to respect the obligations of fallen
governments.4
However, principle or no principle, as time went on, the Russian government
was forced to modify somewhat its position as regards the binding force of
the acts of the previous Russian government. In an exchange of notes with the
British government and later on various different occasions, the Soviet government
either confirmed the validity of a number of earlier agreements, or withdrew its
basic opposition to being bound by the tsarist treaties. Either by governmental
proclamation, by reference in new laws, or official accessions, and even indirectly
by publishing the texts of treaties in force, a number of international agreements
pre-dating the revolution was recognized as remaining in force.5 In particular,
the Soviet regime found it useful to continue its cooperation with other countries
within the framework of various technical and specialized organizations.
In the course of the twenties, the Soviet Union slowly built up its membership
and participation in already established international organizations, including
various technical arrangements. The Soviet Union became a party to the Interna-
tional Metric Union, International Telegraph Union, International Convention
Concerning Protection of Underwater Telegraph Cables, Convention Concerning
Establishment of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs,
Convention Concerning Establishment of a Permanent International Agricultural
Institute, International Office for Public Health, International Agreement for the
Creation of an International Office Dealing with Contagious Diseases of Animals,
Universal Postal Convention, Convention for the Creation in Paris of an Interna-
tional Office of Chemistry, Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of In-
ternational Air Traffic, and so on.
However, while the Soviet Union sought to cooperate in technical organizations,
it refused to be involved in political schemes for the preservation of peace. It
remained a partisan of the doctrine of political disengagement, which, as its leaders
believed, saved the revolution. Not invited to become a member of the League of
Nations, the Soviet government maintained an attitude of criticism and dis-
approval of the regime for the preservation of peace established under its auspices.
A subtle change in the Soviet line occurred in the late twenties, when the Soviet
Union decided to join the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instru-
ment of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact-Treaty of Paris) of August 27, i928.
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This was a first demonstration of Soviet active interest in some forms of collective
security. The 1928 Treaty was followed by three regional agreements connected
with its provisions. On February 9, 1929 the Soviet Union signed a Protocol
concerning the entry into force of the Paris Treaty for the Renunciation of War
(Litvinov Protocol) with Danzig, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Persia, and
Romania. On July 3, 1933, the Soviet Union concluded a convention on the
definition of aggression with Afghanistan, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Persia, Poland,
Romania, and Turkey, and the next day a similar convention with Czechoslovakia,
Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
The new line of policy which slowly took shape in the late twenties and early
thirties was largely due to the growing change in the political climate in Europe.
While initially the Soviet Union could maintain a posture of neutrality in a world
which faced no real chance of major conflagration, the emergence of the dictatorial
regimes in Italy and Germany, and the growing might of the Japanese Empire and
its conquests on the Asian mainland made the Soviet Union vitally interested in the
preservation of the status quo and in preventing wars. Soviet leaders saw them-
selves slowly becoming the main targets of political propaganda campaigns and even
attacked by military force in Soviet territorial possessions. In those circumstances
the Soviet Union was forced to abandon its policy of isolation, and to seek contact
and cooperation with the forces of stability and political Status quo.
In 1933, in a move to strengthen its position, Soviet intransigence as regards non-
compensation for the nationalization of foreign property was abandoned. The
actual concession was not important and involved no financial outlay on the part
of the Soviet Union. In November 15, 1933, the Soviet government concluded a
Gentlemen's Agreement (Litvinov Assignment), with the United States concerning
the settlement of the pre-Soviet Russian government debts to the United States.
The following day the Soviet Union and the United States exchanged notes estab-
lishing diplomatic relations between the two countires. In 1934 the Soviet Union
joined the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization (ILO).
Soviet policy of active participation in various collective security schemes was
closely associated with the person of Maxim Litvinov, who after long years in the
Soviet foreign service finally reached the position of the foreign commissar of the
Soviet Union. There seems to be no doubt that Litvinov himself was earnestly con-
vinced that Soviet security could not be assured except by adhering to the policy of
collective security. However, his position in the government and in the Party was
not strong enough to commit the Soviet Union to this policy. Soviet entry into the
League was understood as an act of political demonstration and a new line in the
Soviet political tactics rather than a genuine change of heart. There was little
evidence that the Soviet Union rendered more than lip service to the aims and goals
of the League of Nations. At any rate its contribution to the prestige and power
of the League could not but only delay (if at all) the process of disillusionment with
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the effectiveness of the great organization, which barely a dozen years earlier was a
source of hope for the world.
Similarly, Soviet representatives in the ILO have done little to promote the work
and the aims of the Organization. In spite of the fact that Soviet delegates par-
ticipated in five of its annual sessions (i9-23), the Soviet government did not accede
at that time to a single of its conventions or agreements seeking to establish interna-
tional standards of employment and improve world labor conditions. Some of the
conventions prepared at that time and approved, also by the Soviet delegation at the
ILO meetings, were ratified by the Soviet Union only after the death of Stalin
(1953). A Soviet manual describing Soviet participation in the work of the ILO
suggested that Soviet delegates to the ILO used its sessions mainly to "expose willful
lies concerning the position of Soviet labor and to inform the public of the great
achievement of the socialist country."'
As time went on, Soviet leadership became convinced that the policy of collective
security was not a realistic policy, committing an error of judgment similar to that
made by the governments of the other great powers of Europe. (Munich Agree-
ment of 1938.) In March 1939 Litvinov was replaced by Molotov, who until that
time was the chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, and Stalin
assumed direct responsibility for the government of Russia, taking in turn Molotov's
position. The new leadership came to terms with Germany and became a party
to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (August 24, 1939). More than twenty years after
Soviet leaders had successfully experimented with the disengagement maneuver the
Soviet government again resorted to the same policy.
II
SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1945
In the perspective of historical experience, the question which must be asked
today is, what is the nature of the Soviet government participation in international
programs involving technical cooperation with other countries, or in organizations
seeking to guarantee peace and collective security in the world?
In the post-World War II period, the Soviet Union built up its membership
in international organizations to the imposing number of some two hundred forty
associations concerned with activities of interest to more than one country. In all
probability in the entire world there is no other country with a government involved
in so many international activities. This high figure is primarily due to the unique
approach of the socialist countries to international relations. In more traditional
societies a good deal of international contact is left to private individuals and
private associations. In the Soviet Union and other socialist states, activities of
business and professional association, of scholars, artists, labor leaders, humanitarians,
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if they extend beyond national boundaries, are a matter of foreign relations and a
government monopoly. Thus the Soviet government in its official capacity is
represented in all type of international associations which, so far as other countries
are concerned, are not inter-governmental organizations. These include those
established for the promotion and advancement of international research and
exchange of information in the field of natural sciences, of humanities (history,
Slavic studies), social studies (International Penal Law Association), cancer,
rheumatism, shipbuilding and construction of roads and bridges, which although
international in scope are "private" in nature. In addition the Soviet Union takes
part in various organizations active in the field of trade and economic cooperation,
international trade union activities, the International Red Cross Organization, and
so on. Not all international organizations of which the Soviet Union is a member
are international in the traditional sense. Yet, even with those corrections, Soviet
membership in international organizations is quite impressive.
Soviet membership in inter-governmental organizations falls in three categories:
By far the largest is that group of international associations which were set up
to deal with concrete, mostly technical problems of international cooperation. They
include railway transport, electric power and its transit, communications including
wireless, protection of natural resources (North Pacific Fur Seal Commission,
International Whaling Commission, North Pacific Fisheries Commission, and so
on). However, the Soviet Union remains uncommitted to international programs
for the protection of copyright and of industrial property, as such rights are differ-
ently conceived and protected by the socialist states for reasons determined by
national policy rather than out of respect for individual initiative and personal
creation.
The second category of Soviet international involvement represents those forms
of collective activity which, broadly speaking, form the United Nations system
of international organizations.
In addition to the U.N., of which the Soviet Union is one of the original mem-
bers, the Soviet Union is a member of the International Labor Organization (since
1954 also Ukraine and Byelorussia have joined ILO); the Economic and Social
Council, Trusteeship Council, Bureau of Technical Assistance of the United Nations
(the Soviet Union contributes financially to that organization since 1953); the
Universal Postal Union, World Meteorological Organization, World Health Or-
ganization, UNESCO (since 1954), and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The Soviet Union is not a member of the following technical organizations
which are a part of the U.N. system: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development; International Monetary Fund; International Finance Corporation;
Food and Agricultural Organization; International Civil Aviation Organization;
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.
Soviet lack of interest in these organizations, especially those that are designed
to render financial and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, seems
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to be indicative of a fundamental opposition to international control of this type
of activity, and may be dictated by a number of reasons. It cannot be excluded that
the Soviet Union, a country with one of the largest national budgets in the world is
unable to contribute to those activities in proportion to its position and influence in
world affairs, a matter of prestige which is an important consideration in Soviet
international policies. In addition the Soviet Union has its own program of eco-
nomic assistance to other countries, which it administers according to policies
dictated by its national interest, and which obviously is in conflict with the policy
of international bodies. The same reason may inspire Soviet non-participation in
the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, which is to bring
agreement and cooperation in this aspect of international economic activity, and
where the Soviet Union has aspirations exceeding its present possibilities.
Soviet participation in various United Nations activities underwent a subtle
change since the death of Stalin and subsequent removal of Molotov from the
control of foreign policies of the Soviet Union. Soviet foreign policy became more
active and more inclined to compromise (e.g., Austria and Laos). The Soviet
Union joined UNESCO; and its participation in the International Labor Organiza-
tion ceased to be a purely nominal affair. Since 1954 the Soviet government began
to take active part in ILO's efforts to establish uniform labor conditions in the
world by ratifying some of the numerous international conventions prepared and
voted at ILO sessions.7
It must be said at once that by no means the Soviet Union became more amen-
able to identify its policies fully with those of the United Nations. The change,
however, signified a more rational attitude to the work of the U.N., and to coopera-
tion with its programs, when this was in the Soviet Union's interest.
"Convention concerning decrease of work hours to forty hours per week (ILO no. 47) of June 22,
1935, ratified by the Soviet Union on June 4, 1956.
Convention concerning annual holidays with pay (ILO no. 52) of June 24, 1936, ratified by the
Soviet Union on: July 6, 1956.
Convention fixing the minimum age for the admission of children to employment at sea (ILO no. 58)
of October 24, 1936, ratified by the Soviet government on July 6, 1956.
Convention fixing the minimum age for admission of children to industrial employment (ILO no. 57)
of June 22, 1937, ratified by the Soviet Union on July 6, 1956.
Convention concerning the age for admission of children to non-industrial employment (ILO no. 6o),
ratified by the Soviet Union on July 6, 1956.
Convention concerning medical examination for fitness for employment in industry of children and
young persons (ILO no. 77) of October 9, 1946, ratified by the Soviet government on July 6, 1956.
Convention concerning the restriction of night work of children and young persons in non-industrial
occupations (ILO no. 78) of October 9, 1936, ratified by the Soviet Union on July 6, x956.
Convention concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to organize (ILO no. 87)
of July 9, 1948, ratified by the Soviet Union on July 6, 1956.
Convention concerning the night work of young persons employed in industry (ILO no. 9o) of
July 10, 1949, ratified by the Soviet Union on July 6, 1956.
Convention concerning the application of the principles concerning the right to organize anid to
bargain collectively (ILO no. 98) of July 10, 1949, ratified on July 6, 1956.
Convention concerning equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value
(ILO no. ioo) of June 29, 1951, ratified by the Soviet government on April 4, 1956.
Convention concerning maternity protection (ILO no. 103) of June 28, 1952, ratified by the Soviet
government on July 6, 1956.
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Soviet attitude towards some of the work done at the U.N. seems to indicate that
a common policy uniting capitalist and socialist countries in certain fields of in-
ternational activity is affected by the ideological dilliculties stemming from different
conceptions as to the historical sense of our times.
III
REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE SovIET BLOC
In contrast, in relations between the socialist countries, the Soviet Union has
demonstrated vigor and initiative in developing programs to realize a concrete vision
of a future world order, of which the present political and economic alignment of
the socialist nations is only a beginning.
To achieve this purpose the Soviet Union and the associated socialist countries
of Europe and Asia have set up a system of international organizations and
cooperation programs, strictly confined to the community (or Commonwealth) of
socialist nations.
In the military field this cooperation began with a network of bilateral alliances
and resulted in 1955 in establishing a Warsaw Treaty Organization which is a
military alliance comparable to NATO. Economic cooperation of the socialist
countries is directed by the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON).
Established in 1949 to regulate and render technical assistance in trade relations.
COMECON grew into an important center dealing with all forms of economic
relations, with the ultimate purpose of intergrating the socialist countries into one
system based upon a regional plan for the distribution of various economic re-
sponsibilities and functions. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid is in charge
of planning, technical and scientific assistance, and research to bring about this
ultimate goal.
Started as a fairly modest organization, COMECON consists now of a great
number of technical organizations, including permament commissions for indi-
dividual industrial branches or specific fields of economic activities, located in the
capitals of the COMECON countries, and an international bank established in 1962
to finance various phases of economic cooperation. The principle of integration
is that the industrial system of the Soviet Union and its vast natural resources, in-
cluding all types of fuels, raw materials, rare metals, and its enormous market
potentialities are to serve as a base for the economic systems of other socialist
countries.
COMECON assists the economic activity of the member countries by unification
of international trade regulations; by planning various phases of the integration
program, stressing the development plans conceived in the perspective of common
needs of the entire bloc; and assisting in the realization of the cooperative projects
designed to serve the economy of a number of COMECON countries. The latter
include various transport facilities (pipelines and power grids), railway communica-
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tions, development of air and sea- fleets, developments of extractive industries, and
market research to place commodity surpluses available in the member countries.
COMECON activities are supported by a number of technical organizations in
charge of special fields of international cooperation between the socialist countries.
These include railway and river transport organizations, conferences of government
departments dealing with communications and custom formalities, the Joint Insti-
tute for Nuclear Research, the Danubian Commission, and various organizations
for the protection of the maritime and fresh water fisheries.
Taken as a whole, the scope of economic and political cooperation of the
Commonwealth of the Socialist Countries, centered upon the idea of their economic
integration, is without precedent in international relations. Its purpose is to
organize a vast area stretching from Central Europe to the Pacific Ocean washing
the shores of Asia into a single economic system. In terms of historical experience
it is comparable to the growth of the American economy. In terms of plans of
social and economic integration it is comparable to the Common Market. Yet
it is fair to mention that the simile is valid in a limited sense only. American
economy filled the great void, and was the achievement of individual initiative. The
Common Market programs bring about the economic integration of Europe by
releasing economic initiative from the restrictions of national boundaries with as
little interference of governmental authority as possible. Unification action is con-
cerned wil the equalization of social and opportunity conditions, and with pre-
vention of discrimination by the governmental authorities of the participating
countries. In addition, Common Market programs are only a return to the
economic unity of Europe, which was already once a historical reality.
. In contrast the program of the socialist integration envisions a totally novel
experience. It relies primarily upon the cooperation of governments and of
specialized governmental agencies. It is centrally planned and calls for detailed
agreements between the governments concerned. It is therefore not surprising
that in terms of governmental organization, it surpasses anything hitherto experi-
enced in the history of human government. It is also not surprising that in terms
of actual performance the results fall far short of achievements in the art of admin-
istrative buildup.
IV
CoOPERATION IN UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: EQUALITY AND VETO
In summarizing the history of the East-West cooperation within the framework
of the United Nations it would not be unfair to state that absence of accord in
practical cases is due to differences in some basic concepts between the socialist and
free economy countries. They have to do with the aims and goals of the inter-
national cooperation, the role of the United Nations in our times, and the meaning
-of some basic concepts of international law. The end result of those differences is
that the Soviet Union and its allies among the socialist countries are unable to
SOVIET BLOC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
agree to common approach with the Western powers in situations in which
ideological differences are involved. They are opposed to efforts which are aimed
at the stabilization of social and economic conditions. They see the purpose of
economic assistance not in the strengthening of the free institutions, but in the
development of planned economy systems. In the Soviet view, economic coopera-
tion and movement of capital should not be the business of individual initiative,
but the instrument of national control of economic resources. National independ-
ence has a meaning in the socialist political dictionary that will not be found in
more traditional systems of political thinking.
These differences, which frequently give occasion to Soviet use of veto power, are
the ultimate reason why a vast majority of U.N. members seek new ways and tech-
niques to fulfill the basic aims and purposes of the United Nations Organization,
which again is a source of irritation and conflict between the socialist and free
economy countries. The growing membership of the United Nations is a source of
pressure upon its institutions to effect change and to increase the influence of the
smaller countries. The growing needs of the modern world and the presence of
great forces of destruction call for a reform of the United Nations Organization
to make it more effective, and a better tool in meeting some of the basic problems
of our times.
It would not be true to state that the Soviet Union is insensitive to the trends in
the public opinion of the world, and if it sees no possibility to make concession to
that point of view it is so because of important reasons fundamental to its position.
A good deal of Soviet attitude to international cooperation with the states of
different social order is due to the feeling of isolation, of the Soviet Union specifically,
and of the socialist states as a whole in a world in which the free economy countries
still vastly outnumber the members of the-Soviet bloc.
This sense of isolation was born at the moment when the Soviet regime realized
that the October revolution would not be followed by communist revolutions in
other countries of Europe. As a result, any plan of political or economic cooperation
with the outside world had to resolve the question of how to neutralize the
capitalist majority in any situation in which it would have a bearing on conditions
and circumstances of cooperation. Lenin's notes made on Chicherin's memorandum
in connection with the departure of the Russian delegation to the Conference of
Genoa (April-May 1922), which came with full documentation ready to justify a
total rejection of all plans for reconciliation, were almost exclusively concerned
with this problem. In order that the Russian delegation might have some chance
of success at the conference table which would draft plans of cooperation, Lenin
insisted that the Conference should include participation on equal footing. of
colonial and dependent nations. The Conference should also admit workers'
organizations, and accept a general principle of nonintervention of international
organizations in the internal affairs of the member countries. Similarly, Lenin
insisted on full equality and numerical parity of representation in all procedures
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concerned with the settlement of disputes between the socialist and capitalist
nations. As regards international arbitration, Lenin thought that only such court
of international arbitration which would consist of an "even number of members,
delegated by both parties, so that half of the members would be imperialists and
half communists,"' would be acceptable to the new Russian government.
The same concern with numbers manifested itself when it became obvious
towards the end of the last World War that the Soviet Union would not be able
to retain the position of isolation and would have to participate in the activities of
the United Nations Organization. The formula for political action in the new
world was the unanimity and concerted action of all big powers so conceived that
the opposition of one would block all effective action. In his report to the
Supreme Soviet on November 6, 1944, Stalin warned that the actions of the future
international organization in safeguarding peace shall only be effective if the great
powers "shall act in the spirit of unanimity and agreement. They will not be
effective if this basic premise is violated."9
The immediate post-war experiences in the conference room, where Soviet
leaders were forced to sit and debate various political and legal problems, have
strengthened even further their dislike of voting procedures. Diplomacy and
negotiations had little to do with deciding questions by putting them to vote.
Molotov, who was the chief Soviet delegate to the Paris Peace Conference of
1946, on several occasions complained bitterly against the voting technique. During
the closing session of the Peace Conference, he denounced the "voting machine"
which forced him to abandon many of his "just" claims. He indicated that the
Soviet delegation favored the unanimity principle, which makes it impossible to
settle international questions at the expense of the weaker party. He spoke darkly
of the dangers associated with the technique of decision by the majority vote:
Veto prevents an agreement of three or four of the big powers to conspire against
one of them. Veto promoted cooperation between the major powers, which is in the
interest of all United Nations and of the entire world. 0
He was convinced that the unanimity principle is superior to the majority vote.
The principle of veto requires that great powers must pay attention to their common
interests . . . preventing the emergence of groupings or of blocs of states directed against
other states, and making it difficult to intrigue with aggressors behind the backs and
contrary to the interests of the peace loving nations."
As the number of the socialist countries grew into a system of socialist states,
the principle of veto became a basic condition to the cooperation between two state
I Zajavlenie sovetskoi delegatsii na pervom plenarnon zasedanii Genuezkoi konferentsii (Declaration
of the Soviet Delegation on the First Plenary Meeting of the Genoa Conference), in 5 DoKUMEnTI
VNESHNEI POLITIKI SSSR (DocuMENTs ONr FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR) 19x-94 (i956).
'Pravda, Nov. 7, 1944.
1 0 MoLrroV, RECHY NA PARYzsKoi KONPERENTSII (SPEECHES AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE) i16 (1946).
"I1d. at iI8.
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systems. The Soviet right to veto any political decision made by the Security
Council guarantees the equality and sovereign rights of the socialist states. It
became thus a principle of peaceful co-existence within the United Nations Or-
ganization. Chairman Khrushchev stressed the wisdom of the Founding Fathers
of the U.N. who "accorded equal rights to each of the great powers, members
of the Security Council, including the Soviet Union, although at that time socialist
countries were in an absolute minority. At that time only the Soviet Union and
the Mongolian People's Republic were socialist states. Nevertheless, the Soviet
Union was given the same rights as all other members of the Security Council."
In his opinion the socialist states were given the same rights to influence the course
of public affairs in the world as all other capitalist states
1 2
Furthermore, the right of veto was a political necessity. As a Soviet jurist
wrote:
The Soviet Union could not but take into account that in the course of the pre-war
years the policy of Western powers towards the Soviet Union was reactionary and
high-handed. It had to remember that anti-Soviet policy was the backbone of the
foreign policy of the Western Powers... j3
In support of the Soviet government position Soviet jurists came out with a number
of legal doctrines, which have promoted the principle of unanimity of great powers
in the Security Council, and of the institution of veto to the central principle
of the decision mechanism in the United Nations.
The highly authoritative 1957 edition of the Soviet treatise on international
law prepared with the participation of the leading Soviet jurists expressed the
view that:
The negative vote of a permanent member (of the Security Council) means that
the decision was rejected. If the permament member decided to refrain from voting,
indicating that this should not be considered as a negative vote . . . the Council has
the right to adopt the decision. Absence of a permament member of the Council,
announced before hand, makes it impossible for the Council to adopt any decision,
except in matters of procedure, as in this case there is no agreement between all the
members of the Security Council.
It is necesary to state in this connection, the absolute illegality of decisions made by
1 N. S. KHRUSHCHEV, ZA MIR, ZA RAZORUZHENIE, ZA SVOBODU NARODOV (FOR PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND
FREEDOM OF PEOPLES), 288. Cf. also Bobrov, Printsip ravnopravia dvukh system v sovremennom
mezhdunarodnom prave (The Principle of Equality of the Two Systems in Contemporary International
Law), [x96o] SovETsKOE GosuDAnSTvo i PRAvo, No. ix; N. A. UsHAxov, PRIrsn' 'EDINoGLAssIA
VELIKIKH DERZHAV V ORGANIZATSII OBJEDINONNIKH NATSUI (THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY OF THE GREAT
POWERS IN THE UNIrED NATIONS) 39-40 (1956).
", UsHAxov, op. cit. supra note 12, at 39.
"The Security Council differs from all other organs of the United Nations also in this respect, that it
alone has the authority to make decisions, which are obligatory for all members of the Organization, while
the Charter contains no obligation to fulfil the recommendations passed by the General Assembly, or other
main organs of the United Nations. Only the Security Council has the power to adopt measures, to
uphold international peace and security, while the General Assembly, which was authorized to examine
"all problems connected with maintaining international peace and security" must all such problems,
requiring such a measure, submit to the Security Council prior or after its examination." Id. at 51.
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the Security Council in 1950 in the matter of Korea in the absence of repersentatives from
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.14
Soviet jurists also found that the veto principle is strengthened by the fact
that in contrast with the League of Nations, which had set up the principle of
equality of the Council and the League Assembly, the United Nations Charter
made a distinction between the respective positions of the General Assembly and
of the Security Council assigning, them different responsibilities. In this setup, the
position of the General Assembly is definitely inferior:
. . . permanent members of the Security Council bear singular responsibility for the
preservation and strengthening the world peace and security ... which is expressed ...
in this, that according to the Charter, the Council is this organ, which is exclusively
competent to institute international sanctions to support international peace and security.
The United Nations Organization differs in this particular point from the League of
Nations, that the Security Council is the only UNO body, which can institute measures
of this type.15
As the unanimity principle in its United Nations version is the only platform
on which socialist and free economy countries can establish working relations, it
assures the universal character of the U.N. As it is absolutely necessary to preserve
this universal character, the unanimity principle is the cornerstone of the present
public order of the world. It must be adhered to, come what may. As Judge
Winiarski from Poland, one of the important representatives of this trend of
thought in the International Court of Justice, stated in his separate opinion in the
case of Certain Expenses of the United Nations:
I . . it has been asserted that the purposes and in particular the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security may provide legal justification for certain decisions, even if
these are not in conformity with the Charter, and that in any event a consideration of
the purposes must furnish guidance as to the interpretation of the Charter. In the case
before the Court, however, this argument certainly has not the importance, which there
is temptation to attribute to it; ... The Charter has set forth the purposes of the United
Nations in very wide, and for that reason too indefinite terms.... It does not follow,
far from it, that the Organization is entitled to seek to achieve those purposes by no
matter what means. The fact that an organ of the United Nations is seeking to achieve
one of those purposes does not suffice to render its action lawful....
The intention of those who drafted it, was clearly to abandon the possibility of useful
action, rather than sacrifice the balance of carefully established fields of competence....
It may be that the United Nations is sometimes not in a position to undertake action
which would be useful for the maintenance of international peace and security, or for
another of the purposes indicated in Article i of the Charter, but that is the way the
Organization was conceived and brought into being.16
Professor Krylov developed this line of thought somewhat further:
"MEZHDNARODNOE PRAVO (IN aNATIoNAL LAW) 330 (1957).
" Usmaxov, op. cit. supra note 12, at 65; see also, F. I. KOZHEVNIKOV (ED.), M-ZHDUnARODNO- PnAvo
(INrTRNATIoNAL LAw) 321, 325 (1957).
" [1962) I.C.J. REPv. 23o.
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The sovereign equality of the UN members finds expression in the fact, that each
country has only one voice. The fact that some decisions of the United Nations organs
are made by the majority vote does not affect that sovereignty, in particular as the
U.N. General Assembly makes only recommendations, which do not create obligations
upon individual states unless expressly accepted by such states. Furthermore, General
Assembly decisions imposed upon the dissenting minority by the mechanical majority
vote, if the minority's interests are in accordance with the aims and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, must be regarded as deprived of legal force. The
minority has the right to reject those decisions.' 7
SUMMARY
To summarize, Soviet attitude to the role of international organizations in our
time seems to reflect a set of conflicting principles. The Soviet government on
the whole has no reservation against participation in the work of technical and
specialized organizations, provided they do not have a general purpose of economic
assistance. Soviet leaders are fully aware that some of the technical problems of
our civilization call for international cooperation.
The Soviet government sees the importance of collective effort and the full
identification of national interests with those of the larger group of nations within
the framework of the socialist system of states.
International cooperation within the U.N. framework is conditioned by the
practical, case-to-case coordination of the interests of the socialist states with those
of states belonging to the different social and economic order. Soviet participation
in the United Nations represents a limited engagement and partial identification
of its national interests with those of the world at large. In this connection, the
concept of national sovereignty and of the legal equality of all members of the
international community becomes rather a concept of the legal equality and of
political independence of the two state systems, which must not, either directly or
indirectly by means of an international organization, interfere in each other's
domestic affairs.
'7 KRYLOV, ISTORIA SOZDANIA ORGANIZATSII OBaJDINONNIKH NATsII (THE HISTORY OF THE CREATION
op THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION) 258 (1952). Cf. MOROZOV, ORGANIZATSIA OBJEDINONNIIKI
NATSIn (UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATON) I68 (1962).
